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1 Introduction
In the paper, I apply the method of dynamic stochastic programming developed in recent years by Lucas and
others1 to the labor market and show that the stochastic transition matrix of an economic model can be de￿ned
in such a way that it is a squared matrix and invertible. This might be helpful for empirical researchers,
when they want to estimate the impulse response of a vector autoregression (VAR).2 In our dynamic stochastic
macroeconomic models, the properties for a stochastic transition matrix to be a squared matrix and invertible
are usually ful￿lled, which I will show by discussing two examples.
The examples are set up in a search economic environment in which unemployed workers are looking for
jobs. Using the method of stochastic dynamic programming, reservation decisions about accepting job o⁄ers
will be derived endogenously. With the simulated optimal policy functions, which result from simulating the
worker￿ s intertemporal maximization problem and which characterize the thresholds of accepting or rejecting a
wage o⁄er, an endogenous squared transition matrix will be de￿ned.
I will discuss next that the squared transition matrix is invertible and, due to this property together with
the assumption of a ￿nite state space, an invariant distribution over states will be de￿ned as well as simulated
and characterizes the stationary equilibrium of the economy. That is, starting from the worker￿ s di⁄erent tran-
sition states, which are summarized by the squared Markov matrix, the economy converges to the invariant
distribution, re￿ ecting the various population fractions for di⁄erent states. The iterations of the transition ma-
trices re￿ ect the model￿ s impulse-responses over time. In my chosen search economic environment, the invariant
distribution describes the fractions of employed or unemployed workers in speci￿c states. Taking the discrete
state space into account, di⁄erent stationary equilibria will be determined.
Therefore, the paper aims to show how the squared transition matrix together with the identity matrix can
describe the impulse-responses over time of an economic model and the calibrated impulse-responses can then
be compared to those generated by empirical researchers. That is, developing a method of how to de￿ne and
get a squared and invertible transition matrix from economic theory might be useful in order to compare the
theoretical impulse-responses with those that result when estimating the impulse responses of VARs.
The next section provides a ￿rst example of an economy in which a worker is searching for a job, and it
de￿nes the transition probability matrix as well as the stationary equilibrium for the economy. In Section 3, the
simulation procedure is described and subsections state the calibration results for this labor market example.
In Section 4, an open economy will be set up, in which workers can be unemployed or employed and searching
for jobs in two countries. The subsections de￿ne the transition matrix as well as the stationary labor market
for the source country and discuss the calibration results. Section 5 concludes.
2 An economy in a ￿rst example
In the ￿rst example, the economy is populated with a ￿nite number of ex ante identical but ex post heterogeneous
workers who can be employed or unemployed. There is no aggregate uncertainty and no variation of an aggregate
state variable over time, but much uncertainty at the individual level.3 The individuals face a version of an
in￿nite horizon search problem. Their option is to manage their state of employment by accepting or rejecting
a job o⁄er, when facing wage and employment shocks. The model uses the previous employment state as a
vehicle of insurance.
1See for example Stokey, Lucas (1989).
2For a more detailed discussion of that relationship see for example Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez and Sargent (2005).
3For a similar approach see Ljungqvist, Sargent (1998, 2005).Method to ￿nd the VARs easily. 3
2.1 The employment decision of a representative worker
Consider a representative worker. The worker sees her new skill level at the beginning of a period, searches for
a job in this period and is employed or unemployed in the next period. That is, at the beginning of each period
t; the worker is unemployed and chooses search e⁄ort et ￿ 0 to look for a job. Search induces disutility c(e),
which is increasing in e and may lead to a wage o⁄er. With probability ￿(et), ￿et > 0, the worker draws a wage
o⁄er in t + 1: The wage o⁄ers are drawn from the time-invariant wage distribution F(w) = Pr(wt+1 ￿ w). The
set of possible wage values is denoted W, W = fw1;:::;wlg. With the wage o⁄er at hand, the worker can accept
or reject the job o⁄er. Accepting a o⁄er implies the worker will be employed in period t+1. Each wage follows
a Markov process with stationary transition probability G(w0jw) = Pr(wt+1 ￿ w0jwt = w) > 0, 8 w;w0 2 W,
independent of all other wage o⁄ers. Rejecting the wage o⁄er means the worker is unemployed in period t + 1.
With probability (1 ￿ ￿(et)), the worker will not receive a wage o⁄er at all.
The worker￿ s skills can stochastically depreciate or accumulate, depending on whether she is employed,
unemployed or laid o⁄. The skills of an unemployed worker depreciate with probability ￿u(h;h0) from h to h0,
where h;h0 2 H is the skill level. For a laid-o⁄ worker, her skills depreciate with probability ￿l(h;h0) in the
initial laid-o⁄ period and with the probability ￿u(h;h0) afterwards. However, if the worker is employed, she
accumulates skills with probability ￿e(h;h0) until she reaches the highest skill level or becomes unemployed.
The worker￿ s skill level stays the same when moving to the other country.
Once the worker has quit the job or is unemployed, she can be entitled for social assistance. On the one
hand, she will be eligible for unemployment bene￿ts b(I), if the government￿ s suitable earning criterion Ie(I) is
higher than the worker￿ s previous earned wage income I(= wh). On the other hand, as long as the government￿ s
suitable earnings are lower than last earnings, no bene￿ts are paid at all. Net bene￿ts are (1￿￿)b(I) with ￿ as
the tax rate.
When the worker was previously employed, she can be laid o⁄ with probability ￿ 2 [0;1] and is unemployed
in period t. Let K be the layo⁄ costs when being laid o⁄ or having quit the job. Laid o⁄ workers can qualify
for unemployment compensation too, if the foregone earnings fall short of the government￿ s suitable earnings
criterion. That is, as long as wh < Iu(I), the worker is eligible for bene￿ts.
At each point in time, the worker￿ s decision problem is described by an individual state vector s 2 S with
s = (h;I) and S is the individual state space with S = H ￿ W for H = fh1;:::;hmg and W = fw1;:::;wlg. On
the basis of this state vector, the worker makes the employment decision.
After the characterization of the worker￿ s environment, her functional equations will be de￿ned. Let
V (h;w;I) be the value of the optimization problem for the worker with skill level h and wage w who was
employed and earned income I in the previous period and who decides upon a speci￿c wage o⁄er to accept the
job. Vb(h;Ik) is the value of the optimization problem for an unemployed worker with skill level h and last
earnings I who is entitled for unemployment compensation. V0(h) is the value for an unemployed worker who
is not entitled to unemployment compensation. The Bellman equations for this sequential search problem are:
V (h;w;I) = max
accept,reject
f￿(h;w); (1)





















































1; if w < Ie(I)=h;
0; if w ￿ Ie(I)=h;
The intertemporal optimization problem (1) ￿(3) can be solved numerically. This gives functions, ￿rst, for the
optimal search intensities e￿
b(h;I) and the reservation wages wb(h;I) for an unemployed worker who is eligible for
unemployment compensation, second, for the optimal search intensities e￿
0(h) and the reservation wages w0(h)
for an unemployed worker who is not entitled for bene￿ts and, third, the reservation wages w(h;w;I) for an
employed worker. The functions w0(h) : S ! R, wb(h;I) : S ! R and w(h;w;I) : S ! R are optimal decision
rules provided they are measurable, feasible and satisfy the functional equations as optimal value functions.4
2.2 The stationary equilibrium for the labor market
With the optimal decision rules at hand, I de￿ne the stationary equilibrium for the labor market, show examples
of transition probability matrices and derive invariant distribution functions for various states. The state space
is S.
Since workers will be heterogeneous in their individual state vectors, a way of describing the heterogeneity
at a point in time is needed. A probability measure de￿ned on subsets of the individual state space is a natural
way of describing this heterogeneity. Let S be the ￿nite set with fs1;:::;srg and   be a probability measure on
(S;S), where S = H ￿ W and S is the Borel ￿-algebra. Thus, for S 2 S;  (S) indicates the mass of workers,
whose individual state vectors lie in S. Notice also that F(0) = 0 and F(w) = 1.
The aggregate state of the economy is given by  . As   changes over time, wages might change too.
However, wages and the wage distributions are assumed to be constant here. For many questions, the dynamics
caused by changing distributions of individual state vectors are of interest. For the question at hand, I de￿ne
a more specialized notion of an equilibrium, in which the probability measure   remains unchanged over time.
4See Theorem 9.2 in Stokey and Lucas (1989).Method to ￿nd the VARs easily. 5
An important technical reason for concentrating on stationary equilibria is that methods for characterizing
equilibria in general, do not exist currently. The paper adopts, therefore, the stationary recursive equilibrium
structure described in Stokey and Lucas (1989, p.320f).5 To de￿ne what it means for a probability measure
  to be stationary over time, a transition function P;P : S ￿ S ! [0;1], is needed. Intuitively, P(s;S) is
the probability that a worker with state s will have an individual state vector lying in S in the next period.
The next paragraph shows how to construct the transition probabilities  (w0(s)jw(s)) and a Markov transition
probability matrix from the decision rules w0(s); wb(s); w(s). Equipped with a well-de￿ned transition function
P, a probability measure   de￿ned on (S;S) is stationary.
De￿nition 1 A stationary recursive equilibrium for the labor market of this economy are reservation wage
functions (w0(s), wb(s), w(s)), and distribution functions  (s) such that
(1) w0, wb, w solve the worker￿ s optimization problem (1)￿ (3)
(2) an n-dimensional vector s 2 Rn records the possible values of the state of the system;
(3) an (n ￿ 1) vector  0 records the probabilities of being in each state i at time 0 with
(a)  0i(S) = Pr[w0(s) = wi(s)],
(b)  0(S) =
Pn
i=1  0i(s) = 1;
(4) an n￿n transition matrix P(s;S) records the probabilities of moving from one value of the state to another
in one period;
(5)  (s) is time-invariant.
The ￿rst condition says workers optimize. The third condition de￿nes the worker￿ s unconditional initial
probabilities and the initial probability distribution over the initial state, the fourth de￿nes the transition
probability matrix, and the ￿fth de￿nes a stationary equilibrium by stating the distribution of workers over
states to be constant.
I compute equilibria for the country￿ s labor market and restrict the analysis to situations, in which a worker
is eligible for unemployment compensation only. The reservation wage wb(s) remains. With these functions at
hand, the partial equilibrium analysis can continue.
The following characterizes a worker￿ s initial probability distribution over states, i.e. situations in which the
worker accepts a wage o⁄er or rejects it and remains unemployed. That is, with the reservation wage of being





F(wb(s)); wb(s) > w;
(1 ￿ F(wb(s))); wb(s) ￿ w;
(4)
The decision rule de￿nes the worker￿ s unconditional probabilities  0i(s) at time 0 for i = 1;2. In the ￿rst initial
state, the worker rejects a wage o⁄er and stays unemployed, whereas in the second initial state, i = 2, the
worker accepts a wage o⁄er and is employed with probability (1 ￿ F(wb(s))). The unconditional probabilities
are used to de￿ne the di⁄erent states in the transition matrix, in which workers can be. I do this next.
5See especially Theorem 11.1 in Stokey, Lucas (1989).Method to ￿nd the VARs easily. 6
The Markov transition matrix de￿nes the conditional transition probabilities of moving from one state to
another, which include the endogenous unconditional probabilities as well as the exogenous probabilities. The
transition probabilities are conditional on the employment state of the current period.
Proposition 2 Let Pij = P(si;fsjg) be the conditional probability of being currently in state i and move to
state j in the next period, then the transition probabilities of the states are de￿ned as




￿F + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿(1 ￿ F)




Proof. Since Pij ￿ 0 and
Pn
j=1 Pij = 1 for i = 1;:::n, P is an n ￿ n Markov matrix.
Here n = 2, so the transition matrix is 2￿2; 6 where F ￿ F(wb(s)) is the unconditional probability of being
unemployed, which depends on the endogenous reservation wage of being eligible for unemployment bene￿ts,
￿ ￿ ￿(e￿(s)) is the endogenous probability of getting a new wage o⁄er, which depends on the optimal search
intensity, with which a worker is looking for a new job, and ￿ is the exogenous probability of being laid o⁄.
The rows de￿ne the two transition probabilities of staying further on unemployed or being employed in the next
period, whereby the ￿rst row is conditional on being unemployed currently, and the second row is conditional
on being currently employed. In the ￿rst row, the ￿rst transition probability, P11; is the probability of being
unemployed in the next period conditional on being currently unemployed and consists of the probability of
rejecting a wage o⁄er ￿F plus the probability of getting no wage o⁄er at all (1 ￿ ￿). P12 is the conditional
probability of being employed in the next period; especially it is the probability of drawing a wage o⁄er times the
probability of accepting it conditional on being currently unemployed. The second row shows the conditional
probabilities of being unemployed or employed in the next period, conditional on being currently employed. P21
is the probability of being unemployed in the next period conditional on being currently employed and de￿nes
the conditional probability as the probability of being laid o⁄ ￿ plus the probability of not being laid o⁄, but
rejecting the new wage o⁄er, (1 ￿ ￿)F. Finally, P22 is the conditional probability of becoming employed next
period conditional on being employed this period and it consists especially of probability of not being laid o⁄
this period times the probability of accepting a new wage o⁄er in the next period, (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F). Thus, i = 1
re￿ ects the transition probabilities of being employed or unemployed in the next period conditional on being
currently unemployed, and i = 2 states the probabilities for the next period￿ s employment states conditional on
being currently employed.
With the transition function P(s;S) at hand, the equilibrium is stationary and described by the invariant
distribution  (s), which is shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 If  (s) satis￿es
(I ￿ P0)  = 0; (6)
the equilibrium is stationary and characterized by the invariant distribution function  (s).
Proof. (6) determines  (s) as an eigenvector associated with a unit eigenvalue of P0. That is, the fact that
P is a stochastic matrix, i.e., it has nonnegative elements and satis￿es
P
j Pij = 1 for all i, guarantees that P
has at least one unit eigenvalue, and there is at least one eigenvector that satis￿es equation (6).
The proposition says that if the transition probabilities in the stochastic matrix P add up to one, which
they should do in ￿nite states and with F(￿) = 1, and if it is a squared matrix, then the transition matrix will
converge to an invariant distribution  , re￿ ecting the stationary steady state of the economy.
6In Section 4, n = 4 and the transition matrix is thus a 4 ￿ 4 matrix.Method to ￿nd the VARs easily. 7
Notice that this proposition seems to be fruitful for empirical researchers, when they try to estimate the
impulse responses of VARs of stochastic recursive models. Equation (6) together with the explicitly de￿ned
transition matrix P(￿) re￿ ect the impulse responses of the economic model and can be used by empirical
researchers to compare the impulse responses of their estimated VARs with those of the economic model.
Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez and Sargent (2005) might have been inspired by some other papers,7
which show the explicit convergence of a squared matrix towards the invariant distribution in a ￿nite state
space, and they see and conclude that transition matrices having similar properties than the transition matrix
P can be used to estimate and compare the impulse responses of VARs. These properties are the discussed
above ones, which can be summarized by, ￿rst, the transition matrix has to be a squared matrix and, second,
if P is a squared matrix, then the transition matrix is stable, which means that the eigenvalues are less than
one in modulus and, therefore, it converges to the invariant distribution. This proposition re￿ ects thus one of
the key result of the paper.
Another result of the paper is the programming part of the model, which allows one to get the calibrated
transition matrix and invariant distribution function of the model, which I will explain next.
3 Simulation Procedure
The following steps have been used to simulate the model. An important assumption is that the state space is
￿nite.
i. In the ￿rst step, I de￿ne all the variables, the parameters and the exogenous Markov matrices of the
model.
ii. In the second step, I program the value functions according to the theoretical model in Mathematica,
where one has to add only the iteration indices to the value functions.
iii. Then the value function iteration can be done. The functions (1) - (3) should to be programmed and then
calculate for each function the norm, starting with V (￿) = 0;Vb(￿) = 0;V0(￿) = 0 and ￿(￿) = 0. After 300
to 500 iterations, the functions usually converge.
iv. In the fourth step, I calculate the optimal search intensities by picking the argmax out of the search
intensities from the right hand side of the ￿nal converged value functions Vb and V0.
v. In the ￿fth step, I select the reservation wages. All these steps are well known.
vi. In the sixth step, I de￿ne the identity matrix as well as the transition matrix. The important steps
are, ￿rst, to de￿ne the transition matrix according to the model, i.e. one has to de￿ne the endogenous
and exogenous probabilities in the transition matrix. In this ￿rst example, the matrix has been de￿ned
according to equation (5). Second, I programmed the transition matrix together with the identity matrix
so that for each state the identity matrix picks the current state and makes all other states to zero. For
each row, the various transition probabilities of the current state have to add up to one. Notice that the
transition matrix has to be programmed in such a way that if the state changes, the transition probabilities
have to change too by moving to the next regarded state.
As far as I know, this step is doable only in Mathematica, since Mathematica allows to program the
dynamic stochastic economic model in a ￿nite state space. It might not be possible in Matlab, since in
Matlab one has to generate the state space, i.e. the grid for the model, which is then in￿nite.
7See for example Birk (2004).Method to ￿nd the VARs easily. 8
vii. The ￿nal step is then to de￿ne the invariant distribution, either by inverting the transition probability
matrix and then taking the vector which is associated with the eigenvalue of one, or taking the limit of
the transition matrix, that is, iterating it. Usually after 50 to 100 iterations the stationary distribution is
found. Both methods will yield the same invariant distribution function.
The invertibility of the transition matrix depends crucially on the ￿nite state space and also on the
property F(￿) = 1. That is, if we allow for a cumulative distribution function, i.e. for probabilities larger
than one, the invertibility of the transition matrix might fail. In our macroeconomic models, however,
this is usually not the case, since all endogenous variables can be expressed relative to output.
3.1 Calibration
Using the above model and simulation procedure, I compute and extensively analyze the numerical example for
the labor market. A worker decides to accept a wage o⁄er or to stay further on unemployed.
The model has been calibrated with the subsequent parameters.8 An employed worker can be laid o⁄ with
probability ￿ = 0:006. Layo⁄ costs are constant K = 5. The discount factor is ￿ = 0:95.
The exogenous wage distribution F(w) is Gaussian with mean 0.7 and variance 0.02. Wages are assumed
to follow a Markov process. The wage for an employed worker stays constant with probability 0.98 and will be
higher with probability 0.02.
The worker￿ s skills change according to ￿ve skill levels evenly divided within the interval h 2 [1:0;1:4]. The
skills of an employed worker remain with probability 0.95 the same, and she accumulates further on skills with
probability 0.05.
Human capital depreciates when the worker is ￿red. When laid o⁄, skills remain constant with probability
0.95 and devaluate with probability 0.05.
After the initial laid-o⁄ period, i.e. during unemployment, the worker￿ s skills stay constant or depreciate.
They devaluate twice as fast as they were accumulated, that is with probability 0.9 they remain the same and
depreciate with probability 0.1.
The worker￿ s disutility of searching for a job, c; and the probability of receiving a wage o⁄er, ￿; depend
positively on search e⁄ort, e, i.e.
c(e) = 0:25 e
￿(e) = 0:5 e0:3:
The government redistributes income, via taxes and transfers, to workers to insure them against income
￿ uctuations. For simplicity, I assume that an unemployed receives 60% of the last net income as unemployment
bene￿ts
b(I) = 0:6 I:
To distinguish between unemployed workers receiving bene￿ts and those without, the government has a
suitable earnings criterion. An unemployed worker, who quits the job or has been laid o⁄, is entitled to
unemployment compensation, when her last income is below 75% of the government￿ s suitable earnings, Ie(I) =
Iu(I) = 0:75 I. She is not eligible for unemployment bene￿ts or her bene￿ts will terminate, if she does not
accept a job o⁄er associated with earnings greater or equal to 75% of previous earnings or her past income was
greater or equal than 75% of the government￿ s suitable earnings criterion. The generated 25 last income levels
fall into the interval I 2 [0;1:5].
8The calibration parameters are in accordance with those chosen by Ljungqvist, Sargent (1998, 2005) or re￿ect data for the
German labor market.Method to ￿nd the VARs easily. 9
The tax rule used by the government has to be speci￿ed as well. Taxes are supposed to be proportional to
the worker￿ s net income with a non-progressive tax rate of ￿ = 0:3. Thus, an employed worker receives an after
tax income of (1 ￿ ￿)wh, and an unemployed worker￿ s net income is (1 ￿ ￿)b(I).
3.2 The calibrated equilibrium for the labor market
In the following, I will state the calibration results for the ￿rst exercise. Showing the optimal search intensities
and the reservation wage functions for employed or unemployed workers seems not especially fruitful here and has
been done, for example, by Ljungqvist, Sargent (1998, 2005). Therefore, I will jump straight to the discussion of
model￿ s results, where the homogenous labor force becomes heterogenous yet. Since each probability distribution
P over the state s converges to the stationary distribution  (s) for all initial probability measures  0, the initial
distributions can be read o⁄ from the initial transition matrix.
In the ￿rst example, the labor market is populated by unskilled workers with low previous earnings, i.e.






and the stationary distribution for t ! n < 1 is
 (h1;I1) = [:20 :80]:
For the ￿rst period, the impulse responses are￿ i.e. the transition matrix shows￿ that 55% are unemployed and
45% are employed currently, conditional on having been unemployed previously, and 11% are unemployed and
89% are employed currently, conditional on having been employed in the last period. After all the adjustment
processes have taken place, and if we consider that the economy consists only of unskilled workers with low
previous earnings, then for that case, the economy will have a stationary unemployment rate of 20% and an
employment rate of 80%.








That is, in the second period and conditional on the previous unemployment of workers, the fraction of unem-
ployed dropped from 55% to 35% and that for employed workers increased from 45% to 65%; and conditional
on having been employed in the previous period, unemployment increased from 11% to 16% and employment
decreased accordingly from 89% to 84%.
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That is, in this ￿rst example, the economy reaches the stationary steady state after 5 periods with an unem-
ployment rate of 20% and an employment rate of 80%.








which induces an invariant distribution function of
 (h1;I25) = [:83 :17]:
This stationary distribution shows that 83% of these workers will, most likely, be unemployed and 17% of them
will be employed in the long-run invariant equilibrium.
The impulse-responses are the following





















until they will ￿nally converge to the stationary distribution function  (h1;I25) = [:83 :17]:
In the last example, in which the economy is populated by skilled workers with high past earnings, the







which implies a stationary distribution function of
 (h5;I25) = [:59 :41]:
This means when the economy has skilled workers with high previous incomes, 59% of them will be unemployed
and 41% will be employed in the steady state.
4 Second Example
In the second example, I will con￿rm the above statements about the invertibility of the transition matrix P,
which means the transition probability matrix and the term (I ￿P0) are the outcomes of the theoretical model
and can be used as VARs by empirical researchers. I will show that the transition matrix is also a squared
matrix and invertible and can, after some manipulations, according to Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez
and Sargent (2005), be used by VAR researchers to match the impulse responses of a VAR and the economic
model. In this second exercise, a representative worker has to make more than one decision and adjudicatesMethod to ￿nd the VARs easily. 11
not only upon employment, but also whether she will stay further on in her home country or moves to another
country. The set up of this model changes only slightly compared to the ￿rst one.
The worker sees her new skill level at the beginning of a period, searches for a job in both countries,
migrates or stays and is employed or unemployed in the next period. That is, at the beginning of each period
t; the worker is unemployed and chooses search e⁄ort et;k ￿ 0 to look for a job in the origin (source) or
foreign (destination) country, k 2 fo;fg. Let Tk be the ￿xed migration cost when moving. Search induces
disutility c(ek), which is increasing in ek, and may lead to a wage o⁄er. With probability ￿(et;k), ￿et;k > 0, the
worker draws a wage o⁄er in t + 1: The job o⁄ers come from the countries￿time-invariant wage distributions
Fk(wk) = Pr(wk;t+1 ￿ wk) that di⁄er in means and variances. The source country has a lower mean wage
and smaller wage variances than the destination country. For each country, the set of possible wage values is
denoted Wk, Wk = fwk;1;:::;wk;lg. With the wage o⁄er at hand, the worker can accept or reject the job o⁄er
in either country. Accepting a foreign o⁄er implies the worker will migrate in t + 1 to the destination country
and will be employed in period t+1. Each wage follows a Markov process with stationary transition probability
G(w0
kjwk) = Pr(wk;t+1 ￿ w0
kjwk;t = wk) > 0, 8 wk;w0
k 2 Wk, independent of all other wage o⁄ers. Rejecting
the wage o⁄er means the worker is unemployed in period t + 1. With probability (1 ￿ ￿(et;k)), the worker will
not receive a wage o⁄er at all.
Once the worker has quit the job or is unemployed, she can be entitled for social assistance. On the one hand,
she will be eligible for unemployment bene￿ts b(Ik), if the government￿ s suitable earning criterion Ie(Ik) is higher
than the worker￿ s previous earned wage income Ik(= wkh). On the other hand, as long as the government￿ s
suitable earnings are lower than last earnings, no bene￿ts are paid at all. Net bene￿ts are (1￿￿)b(Ik) with ￿ as
the tax rate. Due to simplicity, I assume that both countries have the same rules for the eligibility of bene￿ts
and that past earnings can be transferred to the other country without any institutional problems.
When the worker was previously employed, she can be laid o⁄ with probability ￿ 2 [0;1] and is unemployed
in period t. Let K be the layo⁄ costs when being laid o⁄ or having quit the job. Laid o⁄ workers can qualify
for unemployment compensation too, if the foregone earnings fall short of the government￿ s suitable earnings
criterion. That is, as long as wkh < Iu(Ik), the worker is eligible for bene￿ts.
At each point in time, the worker￿ s decision problem is described by an individual state vector sk 2 Sk
with sk = (h;Ik) and Sk is the individual state space with Sk = H ￿ Wk for H = fh1;:::;hmg and Wk =
fwk;1;:::;wk;lg. On the basis of this state vector, the worker makes decisions for migration and employment.
After the characterization of the worker￿ s environment, her functional equations will be de￿ned. Let
V (h;wk;Ik) be the value of the optimization problem for the worker with skill level h and wage wk who
was employed and earned income Ik in the previous period and who decides upon a country speci￿c wage o⁄er
to migrate and quit the job. Vb(h;Ik) is the value of the optimization problem for an unemployed worker with
skill level h and country speci￿c last earnings Ik who is entitled for unemployment compensation. V0(h) is the
value for an unemployed worker who is not entitled to unemployment compensation. The Bellman equations
for this sequential search and migration problem are:
V (h;wk;Ik) = max
accept,reject
f￿(h;wk); (7)























































1; if wk < Ie(Ik)=h;
0; if wk ￿ Ie(Ik)=h;
Tk =
(
1; if wm(h;Ik) ￿ wb;k(h;Ik);
0; if wm(h;Ik) < wb;k(h;Ik):
For each country k 2 fo;fg, the intertemporal optimization problem (7) ￿(9) can be solved numerically. This
gives functions, ￿rst, for the optimal search intensities e￿
b;k(h;Ik) and the reservation wages wb;k(h;Ik) for an
unemployed worker who is eligible for unemployment compensation, second, for the optimal search intensities
e￿
0;k(h) and the reservation wages w0;k(h) for an unemployed worker who is not entitled for bene￿ts and, third,
the reservation wages wk(h;wk;Ik) for an employed worker. The reservation migration wage wm(h;Ik) for
a migrating worker is de￿ned as wm;k ￿ maxfwb;o;wb;fg. The functions w0;k : Sk ! R, wb;k : Sk ! R,
wm;k : Sk ! R and wk : Sk ! R are optimal decision rules provided they are measurable, feasible and satisfy
the functional equations as optimal value functions.
4.1 The stationary equilibrium for the labor market
With the optimal decision rules at hand, I de￿ne the stationary equilibrium for the source country, show
examples for transition probability matrices and derive invariant distribution functions for various states. Even
though workers look for jobs in two labor markets, the stationary equilibrium will be derived for the source
country only.9 Therefore, Sk ￿ So, and for this section I just write S as the state space.
9The reasons for this is that, otherwise, I had to formulate the decision problem of a worker in the destination country as well.
This would imply that I had to take her decision into account too, i.e. making it endogenous. After that, I should had set up a
transition probability matrix, which had to hold for each country indicated by the subscript k 2 fo;fg. In general, this is doable,
but a bit more complicated and would not yield any new insights.Method to ￿nd the VARs easily. 13
Since domestic workers will be heterogeneous in their individual state vectors, a way of describing the
heterogeneity at a point in time is needed. Again, a probability measure will be de￿ned on subsets of the
individual state space to capture the heterogeneity. Let S be the ￿nite set with fs1;:::;srg and   be a probability
measure on (S;S), where S = H ￿ W and S is the Borel ￿-algebra. Thus, for S 2 S;  (S) indicates the mass
of workers, whose individual state vectors lie in S. Notice also that Fk(0) = 0 and Fk(wk) = 1.
The next paragraph shows again how to construct the transition probabilities  (w0(s)jw(s)) and a Markov
transition probability matrix from the decision rules w0;k(s); wb;k(s); wk(s); wm(s). Equipped with a well-
de￿ned transition function P, a probability measure   de￿ned on (S;S) is stationary.
De￿nition 4 A stationary recursive equilibrium for the labor market of this economy are reservation wage
functions (w0;k(s), wb;k(s), wk(s), wm;k(s)) and distribution functions  (s) such that
(1) w0;k, wb;k, wk solve the individual￿ s optimization problem (6)￿ (8); wm;k ￿ maxfwb;o;wb;fg
(2) an n-dimensional vector s 2 Rn records the possible values of the state of the system;
(3) an (n ￿ 1) vector  0 records the probabilities of being in each state i at time 0 with
(a)  0i(S) = Pr[w0(s) = wi(s)],
(b)  0(S) =
Pn
i=1  0i(s) = 1;
(4) an n￿n transition matrix P(s;S) records the probabilities of moving from one value of the state to another
in one period;
(5)  (s) is time-invariant.
Once again, I compute equilibria for the source country￿ s labor market and restrict the analysis to situations,
in which a worker is eligible for unemployment compensation only. The reservation wage functions wb;o(s) and
wm(s) remain. With these functions at hand, the partial equilibrium analysis can continue.
The following characterizes a worker￿ s initial probability distribution over states, i.e. situations where the
worker migrates or stays and accepts a wage o⁄er or remains unemployed. That is, with the reservation wages
for employment and migration, wb;o(s) and wm(s), respectively, a worker can be in one of four states
 0i(s) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
Ff(wm(s)) ￿ Fo(wb;o(s)); wf < wm(s);wb;o(s) > wo;
[1 ￿ Ff(wm(s))] ￿ Fo(wb;o(s)); wf > wm(s);wb;o(s) > wo;
Ff(wm(s)) ￿ [1 ￿ Fo(wb;o(s))]; wf < wm(s);wb;o(s) ￿ wo;
[1 ￿ Ff(wm(s))] ￿ [1 ￿ Fo(wb;o(s))]; wf > wm(s);wb;o(s) ￿ wo:
(10)
The decision rules de￿ne the worker￿ s unconditional probabilities  0i(s) at time 0 for i = 1;:::;4. In the ￿rst
state, the worker is unemployed and stays in the source country, whereas Fo(wb;o(s)) re￿ ects the unconditional
probability of being unemployed, which depends on the reservation wage of being eligible for unemployment
bene￿ts, and Ff(wm(s)) is de￿ned as the unconditional probability of staying in the source country, which
depends on the reservation wage for migration. The second state re￿ ects the unconditional probability of being
unemployed, but moving to the destination country. The third state is de￿ned as the unconditional probabilityMethod to ￿nd the VARs easily. 14
of staying in the source country and being employed. And ￿nally, the fourth state is de￿ned as the unconditional
probability of being employed in the destination country.
In the next step, I use these unconditional probabilities to de￿ne the Markov transition matrix, which shows
then the conditional transition probabilities of moving from one state to another.
Proposition 5 Let Pij = P(si;fsjg) be the conditional probability of being currently in state i and move to
state j in the next period, then the transition probabilities of the states are










Fm[￿Fo + (1 ￿ ￿)] (1 ￿ Fm)[￿Fo + (1 ￿ ￿)] Fm￿(1 ￿ Fo) (1 ￿ Fm)￿(1 ￿ Fo)
￿[￿Ff + (1 ￿ ￿)] (1 ￿ ￿)[￿Ff + (1 ￿ ￿)] ￿￿(1 ￿ Ff) (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ Ff)
Fm[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)Fo] (1 ￿ Fm)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)Fo] Fm(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ Fo) (1 ￿ Fm)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ Fo)











Proof. Since Pij ￿ 0 and
Pn
j=1 Pij = 1 for i = 1;:::;n, P is an n ￿ n Markov matrix.
Notice that I have used the abbreviations of Fo ￿ Fo(wb;o(s)) as the unconditional probability of being
unemployed in the source country, Ff ￿ Ff(wb;f(s)) as the unconditional probability of being unemployed in
the foreign country, (1￿Fm(wm(s))) as the unconditional probability of migrating to the destination country and
Fm ￿ Ff(wm(s)) as the unconditional probability of staying in the source country. Furthermore, ￿ ￿ ￿(e￿
f(s))
is the endogenous job o⁄er probability.
The ￿rst row re￿ ects all future states conditional on being currently unemployed in the source country.
Especially, P11;o is the conditional probability of being unemployed in the next period in the source country,
P12;o is the conditional probability of being unemployed in the next period in the destination country, where ￿
is the exogenous probability of staying in the destination country. P13;o is the conditional probability of being
employed in the source country in the future, and P14;o is the conditional probability of being employed in the
destination country in the future. The second row i = 2 states the transition probabilities for the next period
conditional on being currently unemployed in the destination country, i = 3 de￿nes the possible states in the
next period conditional on being currently employed in the source country and i = 4 shows the transitions
states for the next period conditional on being employed in the destination country currently.
With the transition function P(s;S) at hand, the equilibrium of the source country is stationary and de-
scribed by the invariant distribution  (s), which is shown in the next proposition:
Proposition 6 If  (s) satis￿es
(I ￿ P0)  = 0; (12)
the equilibrium is stationary and characterized by the invariant distribution function  (s).
Proof. (12) determines  (s) as an eigenvector associated with a unit eigenvalue of P0. That is, the fact
that P is a stochastic matrix, i.e., it has nonnegative elements and satis￿es
P
j Pij = 1 for all i, guarantees that
P has at least one unit eigenvalue, and there is at least one eigenvector that satis￿es equation (12).Method to ￿nd the VARs easily. 15
4.2 Calibration
I follow the same simulation procedure as described in Section 3, and I take nearly the same parameter values
for the second model as I used in the ￿rst model except for the following. Migration costs depend on the
worker￿ s decision to migrate or to stay. If she migrates, migration costs are Tf = 12 and otherwise To = 0. The
exogenous probability of returning from the destination to the source country (1￿￿) is 0:05, a value similar to
empirical studies. The exogenous wage distributions Fk(wk); k 2 fo;fg, are Gaussian distributions with mean
0.5 and variance 0.01 for the source country and with mean 0.7 and variance 0.02 for the destination country.
4.3 Calibrated stationary equilibrium for the labor market
I neglect to state the reservation wages for a worker who decides about migrating to another country or staying
in her home country, which I did in my (2005) paper. Here I will discuss how to derive the transition probability
matrices taking into account that the reservation wages for employment and migration of a worker have been
simulated. Using these optimal decision policies for an individual migrant, the stationary equilibrium of the
labor market for the source country will be calibrated.
In the ￿rst example, the source country is populated by unskilled workers with low previous earnings,






:06 :54 :04 :36
:52 :03 :43 :02
:02 :19 :08 :71





and the stationary distribution is
 (h1;I1) = [:13 :15 :39 :33]:
The impulse responses shown in the transition matrix are for the ￿rst row, which expresses the condition
of being currently unemployed in the source country, the probability of being further on unemployed in the
source country in the next period is P11 = :06, the probability of being unemployed in the destination country
in the next period is P12 = :54, the probability of being employed in the source country is P13 = :04 and
￿nally the probability of being employed in the destination country in the next period is P14 = :36, and so
forth for the remaining rows. Finally the economy, which is populated by unskilled workers with low previous
incomes, converges to its stationary steady state, t ! n < 1; in which 13% of the workers will probably stay
unemployed in the source country (they are called ￿ unemployed stayers￿ ), 15% want to migrate and will most
likely be unemployed in the destination country (￿ unemployed movers￿ ), 39% will stay employed in the source
country (￿ employed stayers￿ ), and 33% are employed movers. That is,   describes the stationary distribution
for this economy.
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and so forth until the economy reaches ￿nally the stationary distribution  (h1;I1).
In the second example, the source country is populated by unskilled workers with high previous earnings,







:36 :58 :02 :04
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and the stationary distribution is
 (h1;I25) = [:52 :35 :08 :05]:
For this state with unskilled workers with high past incomes, 52% of them will, most likely, be unemployed
stayers, 35% are unemployed movers, 8% are employed stayers, and 5% are employed movers.
In the third example, the source country is populated by middle skilled workers with high previous earnings,






:14 :80 :01 :05
:85 :04 :10 :01
:07 :42 :07 :43





and the stationary distribution is
 (h3;I25) = [:41 :40 :11 :08]:
For this state with middle skilled workers with high past incomes, 41% of them will, most likely, be unemployed
stayers, 40% are unemployed movers, 11% are employed stayers, and 8% are employed movers.
In the last example, the source country is populated by skilled workers with high previous earnings, i.e.







:09 :84 :01 :06
:84 :04 :11 :01
:05 :44 :05 :46







and the stationary distribution is
 (h5;I25) = [:38 :40 :13 :09]:
For this state with skilled workers with high past incomes, 38% of them will, most likely, be unemployed stayers,
40% are unemployed movers, 13% are employed stayers, and 9% are employed movers.Method to ￿nd the VARs easily. 17
5 Conclusion
In the paper, I showed that the transition matrix of a stochastic dynamic macro model can be de￿ned as a
squared matrix which is then, in connection with an identity matrix and the ￿nite state space, invertible. The
calibrated impulse-responses of the model can now be compared with those generated by empirical researchers.
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